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EXPERIENCE MATTERS: THE RISE OF A
SUPREME COURT BAR AND ITS EFFECT
ON CERTIORARI
Joseph W. Swanson*
I. INTRODUCTION
During Maureen Mahoney's oral argument in the Michigan
affirmative action cases, then-Chief Justice Rehnquist addressed
his former clerk as "Maureen."' In that same case, Justices
Stevens and Souter called one of the amicus briefs the "Carter
Phillips brief' and the "Phillips brief," apparently referring to
the well-known advocate whose name appeared on its cover.
2
These rare personal references illustrate the growing familiarity
between the Justices and the lawyers who appear before them
frequently, particularly those attorneys who have devoted their
practices to mastering Supreme Court advocacy.
The rise of a dedicated Supreme Court bar has attracted
considerable attention from the press3 as well as comment from
* The author, a graduate of the Georgetown University Law Center and formerly a clerk
for the Honorable J. Frederick Motz of the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, is an associate with Arnold & Porter LLP in Washington, D.C. This article
would not have been possible without Professor Richard Lazarus's insight and
encouragement.
1. Tony Mauro, Getting Personal, XXV Am. Law 33 (May 2003).
2. Id.
3. See e.g. Joan Biskupic, Lawyers Emerge as Supreme Court Specialists, USA Today
6A (May 16, 2003) ("[In the past several years, an elite group of repeat performers that
specializes in Supreme Court arguments has emerged."); Tony Mauro, Building a Better
Advocate, XXIV Am. Law. 73 (Oct. 2002) ("[T]he advocates who appear before [the
Justices] seem more and more familiar-a confrerie of lawyers who argue more frequently
at the Court than was common among their predecessors."); Marcia Coyle, High Court
Bar's "Inner Circle," Nati. L.J. Al, A16 (Mar. 3, 1997) (reporting on the "select cadre of
high court stars ... to whom parties are increasingly turning because of their familiarity
with the ways of the court and their track records").
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current and former members of the bar itself.4 This commentary
has generally focused exclusively on the role that the specialized
bar plays at oral argument and its effect on the merits of each
case, 5 but this paper examines a relatively underappreciated
issue: whether these elite Supreme Court practitioners enjoy
disproportionate success at the critical certiorari stage.
6
The article begins by documenting the historical
development of the Supreme Court bar and profiling a few of its
elite members. Then, using earlier studies and anecdotal and
statistical evidence, this paper shows that these specialists play a
particularly influential role in shaping the Court's agenda. After
a discussion of certiorari practice in general, the paper concludes
with a qualitative analysis of three successful petitions. These
petitions, each written by a leading Supreme Court practitioner,
prove that the unique skills that come with specialization
distinguish these advocates from their peers7 and likely account
for their greater success at obtaining certiorari.
II. THE MODERN SUPREME COURT BAR
A. Overview
By the mid-1990s, several Washington firms began
developing Supreme Court practice groups.8  That trend
continues today, with an increasing number of firms focused on
4. See John G. Roberts, Jr., Oral Advocacy and the Re-emergence of a Supreme Court
Bar, 30 J. S. Ct. History 68, 68 (2005) ("Over the past generation, roughly the period since
1980, there has been a discernible professionalization among the advocates before the
Supreme Court, to the extent that one can speak of the emergence of a real Supreme Court
bar."); Thomas Goldstein, The Expansion of the "Supreme Court Bar, " SCOTUSblog,
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2006/03/the-expansion-o.html (Mar. 2,
2006, 11:32 a.m. EST) (commenting on expansion of specialized Supreme Court bar).
5. See e.g. Biskupic, supra n. 3, at 6A.
6. Cf Thomas Goldstein, One Plugged, Thousands to Go, 25 Leg. Times 68 (Nov. 18,
2002) ("With the exception of a few high-profile matters, the [Jlustices' agenda-setting role
is regarded as too complicated or too trivial to merit much discussion, even in the academic
literature.").
7. See infran. 152.
8. Coyle, supra n. 3, at A16 (discussing several firms that had Supreme Court
practices in 1996).
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Supreme Court work. One informal survey found that between
late 1999 and early 2006, the number of firms offering
established Supreme Court practices grew from nine to twenty-
four, a remarkable increase of fifteen firms in just six years. 9
This proliferation of Supreme Court specialization has led to a
dramatic rise in the number of repeat appearances at oral
argument by lawyers who can be characterized as Supreme
Court elites.*
°
With seventeen oral arguments to his credit, Thomas C.
Goldstein of Akin Gump exemplifies the trend toward Supreme
Court specialization." In fact, Goldstein's former law firm
touted itself as "the nation's only Supreme Court litigation
boutique."' 12 In 1999, when he launched that firm, Goldstein
believed that "there were many opportunities to bring cases to
the Supreme Court that no one was taking there.' 13 With that in
mind, Goldstein aimed, not only to win cases on the merits, but
also to develop an expertise at certiorari practice. ' 4 According to
Goldstein, understanding what motivates the Justices to accept a
case is critical to building a successful Supreme Court practice
and helps distinguish him as a leading appellate advocate.15
While Goldstein's founding of his own boutique presents
one successful approach to Supreme Court specialization, Mayer
9. Goldstein, supra n. 4.
10. See id.
11. See Thomas C. Goldstein, http://www.akingump.com/attomey.cfm?attomey id=26
62 (law-firm biography noting Goldstein's prior association with Goldstein & Howe, and
summarizing his Supreme Court experience).
12. See e.g. Jason Boog, Thomas C. Goldstein, in 40 Under 40: Young Lawyers Chalk
up Impressive Achievements and Exert Influence, 27 Nati. L. J. S8 (May 9, 2005) (noting
Goldstein's "unusual dream" of restricting his practice to arguing before the Supreme
Court).
13. Jonathan Groner, Thomas Goldstein-Goldstein & Howe, in 12 Winning
Arguments: D.C.-area Lawyers Who Make Their Mark in Appellate Litigation, 27 Leg.
Times 32 (July 19, 2004).
14. Id. He succeeded in developing that expertise, of course, and he has since wound up
the business of Goldstein & Howe and joined the Washington office of Akin Gump. See n.
11, supra.
15. See id. Goldstein explained, "The reasons that the Court takes cases have nothing to
do with the reasons that lawyers want them to take cases. The Court cares about circuit
conflicts, and I built my practice around circuit conflicts." Id. For a more detailed
discussion of the factors influencing the Court's decision to accept a case for review, see
infra pp. 183-86.
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Brown offers another, and on a larger scale. This international
law firm boasts one of the country's leading appellate litigation
departments and views Supreme Court work as "its signature
dish."'16 Founded in the mid-1980s, the firm's appellate section
includes a "dream team" among whose members are Andrew J.
Pincus and several other former members of the Solicitor
General's office who, over the course of their careers, have
argued almost 200 cases before the Supreme Court.17 Reflecting
the importance firms now place on specialization, Mayer Brown
maintains a website devoted exclusively to appellate practice
that offers resources ranging from Supreme Court docket reports
to recent briefs filed with the Court.' 8
Finally, Sidley Austin's Carter G. Phillips, one of the
earliest to focus his career on Supreme Court work, now stands
out as one of the elite circle's most successful members.
Phillips's widely known accomplishments' 9 underscore his
professional success, and confirm the degree to which Supreme
Court practice has become dominated by a handful of repeat
players.
B. The Supreme Court Bar and Certiorari Practice
One significant consequence of the growing specialization
in Supreme Court advocacy is, as a study by Kevin McGuire
indicates,2 ° the fact that certain practitioners seem able to
routinely persuade the famously skeptical Justices to accept their
clients' cases. Given the overwhelming odds against obtaining
16. Nathan Koppel, Mayer, Brown: A Private SG's Office, 23 Leg. Times 16 (Oct. 30,
2000).
17. See Oral Arguments by Mayer, Brown Attorneys, http://www.appellate.net/sctoral
args.
18. See Appellate.Net, http://www.appellate.net (noting that, in addition to information
about Mayer Brown's attorneys and their cases, the site contains "information and links
relevant to Supreme Court and appellate practice").
19. See Carter G. Phillips, http://www.sidley.com/lawyers/bio-print.asp?id=3913 (law-
firm biography indicating that Phillips clerked for Chief Justice Burger and worked in the
Solicitor General's office before entering private practice, and that he has argued more than
fifty cases in the Supreme Court).
20. See Kevin T. McGuire, The Supreme Court Bar: Legal Elites in the Washington
Community 197-98 (U. Press of Va. 1993) (concluding that, in general, the Justices are
more disposed to grant review for petitions written by elite Supreme Court practitioners).
THE SUPREME COURT BAR AND GRANTS OF CERTIORARI
certiorari, this may be the most important skill that these
advocates possess.2 1 Indeed, the McGuire study, which
examines data from the late 1970s and early 1980s, found that
the presence of experienced counsel at the petition stage played
an influential role even then in determining whether the Justices
voted to hear a case.
22
In explaining his findings, McGuire cites with approval the
conviction of experienced Supreme Court advocates that their
higher success rates can be attributed to a pair of reasons: the
quality and credibility of their petitions.23 As to the first factor,
McGuire posits that experienced Supreme Court litigators
generally craft persuasive and well-organized petitions for
24certiorari, which enjoy improved prospects for success.
Moreover, a petition filed by an elite Supreme Court practitioner
carries with it a certain aura of credibility, which stems from the
advocate's carefully guarded reputation for good judgment.25 As
one veteran attorney explained, "We don't want to put a silly
petition up there." 6 Thus, when an expert Supreme Court
litigator actually seeks review, the Justices can assume that the
issues presented merit their attention.27
In a more recent study, McGuire considers the role that
former law clerks play in subsequent private practice before the
Court.2 8 He maintains that former clerks argue before the
Justices more often than other attorneys, and that they influence
the outcomes in a relatively high percentage of Supreme Court
21. See id. at 198 ("On balance, specialized representation, while important at [the
merits stage], appears to be more significant at the petition stage. These expert lawyers...
are engaged as a means of gaining access.").
22. Id. at 181-82. According to McGuire's study, twenty-two percent of the cases
brought by experienced Court litigators gained review, while only six percent of the cases
brought by non-expert practitioners succeeded at the petition stage. Id. at 181. Even after
controlling for other variables, McGuire concluded that "experienced Supreme Court
representation stands out as an important predictor." Id. at 182.
23. Id. at 172.
24. Id. at 173 (noting that experienced Supreme Court counsel "have developed the
skills necessary to make petitions attractive to the Court").
25. Id. at 175.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Kevin T. McGuire, Lobbyists, Revolving Doors and the U.S. Supreme Court, 16
J.L. & Pol. 113 (2000).
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cases. 29  Apparently, the clerks' earlier behind-the-scenes
experience gives them a distinct advantage in later practice
before the Court. 30  Although McGuire's study omits
consideration of the former clerks' influence at the certiorari
stage,3 1 it would seem that the same insight that leads to success
on the merits in private practice likewise confers advantages
when petitioning the Court for review.
An article examining the effect of amicus curiae briefs at
the Supreme Court also offers circumstantial support for the
proposition that experience matters when seeking plenary
review.32 The article, which relies on seventy interviews with
former Supreme Court clerks,3 3 probes whether the identity of
an amicus brief's author influences the level of consideration
given to it. 34 Notably, eighty-eight percent of the clerks
interviewed admitted that they paid more careful attention to
amicus briefs written by renowned attorneys. 35 The clerks
generally identified about two dozen lawyers, including Carter
Phillips, who, by virtue of their reputation, commanded a close
read. Like McGuire's findings, these results imply that
experienced Supreme Court advocates probably fare better at the
certiorari stage than do their less experienced counterparts.
The practitioners themselves certainly believe that they
make a difference. According to one advocate, "Hiring a lawyer
at the cert stage who has a reputation at the Supreme Court for
playing by the Court's rules is one of the most important things
29. Id. at 114 (noting the movement of former clerks into Washington law firms), 130
(citing statistics to support the claim that "the side with the greater number of [former
clerks] preparing and arguing its case is more likely to win").
30. See id. at 120-21. As one former clerk said, "[Our] sense of what sorts of legal
arguments will fly and which ones will draw hoots is almost always more acute than that of
[the lawyer] lacking such exposure." Id.
31. Id. at 136-37. McGuire acknowledges that his article leaves "some fairly interesting
questions unanswered," including whether former Supreme Court law clerks' experience
with the Justices enables them to later enjoy greater success at the case-selection stage. Id.
32. See Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus
Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & Pol. 33 (2004).
33. Id. at 33.
34. Id. at 52-56.
35. Id. at 54-56. One clerk explained, "A famous name creates a certain level of
expectation; it is a natural human quality to look at the source." Id. at 55.
36. See id. at 53-55.
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a client can do in terms of getting attention paid to his cert
petition. 37 Similarly, a Mayer Brown partner attributes his
firm's thriving appellate practice to the "perception that when
you are heading to the Supreme Court, you need someone who
knows his or her way around., 38 Finally, Phillips notes that he is
likely to share a "reasonably similar perspective on a case" with
the Justices. 39 His clients concur, with one in particular calling
Phillips an "important filter through which we pass all the cases
in which there is a potential Supreme Court petition. 40
These practitioners' remarkable success confirms the
impression that experienced representation makes a difference at
the certiorari stage. For instance, the Stanford Law School
Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, founded and taught by
Goldstein and Stanford professor Pamela Karlan, herself an
experienced Supreme Court advocate and former Blackmun
clerk,4  had each of its first four cases granted review by the
Court.42 A partner at Mayer Brown once filed five consecutive
successful certiorari petitions.43 And among the more than fifty
cases that Phillips has argued in the Supreme Court are at least
37. McGuire, supra n. 20, at 183-84.
38. Tony Mauro, Highly Specialized, XXV Am. Law. 77 (Sept. 2003) (quoting Kenneth
Geller, who had argued three cases during what was then the most recent Term); see also
Appellate. Net-Nature of Practice (describing the character of Mayer Brown's Supreme
Court practice, and indicating that its members "frequently work as co-counsel with
litigators at other law firms who seek assistance in handling cases in the Supreme Court,
ranging from help in drafting petitions and briefs to preparation for oral argument").
39. Tony Mauro, Carter Phillips' Powers of Persuasion, 23 Leg. Times 13 (Oct. 16,
2000).
40. Id. That client added, "If [Phillips] says we don't have a prayer that the Supreme
Court will accept a case, we take his advice and don't file. He saves us a lot of money." Id.
41. See Pamela S. Karlan, http://www.law.stanford.edu/directory/profile/32/Pamela%2
05.%2OKarlan (faculty biography indicating that Karlan clerked for both Judge Abraham
D. Sofaer of the Southern District of New York and Justice Blackmun).
42. Law Students Enjoy Supreme Success, Stanford Magazine (Jan./Feb. 2005)
(available at http://www.stanfordalumni.org/news/magazine/2005/janfeb/farm/news/law.ht
ml); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Thomas C. Goldstein & Amy Howe, Go East Young
Lawyers: The Stanford Law School Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, 7 J. App. Prac. &
Process 207 (2005) (describing history of Stanford clinic and including table that shows its
early results).
43. Mauro, supra n. 38, at 77.
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seventeen in which he was also responsible for drafting the
petitions."
The cases in which review was granted during the Term
studied for this article show continuing success for these elite
advocates. Indeed, Mayer Brown attorneys persuaded the
Justices to accept several of the firm's cases during the studied
Term.45 Likewise, the Court once granted three of Phillips's
petitions within the span of just two weeks.46 These success
rates are especially striking when one considers that in recent
Terms, the Supreme Court has granted review in only about four
percent of all paid cases filed.4fEvidently, experienced Supreme
Court advocates play a pivotal role at the certiorari stage.
III. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT: OBTAINING CERTIORARI
The material in this section provides a brief summary of the
certiorari process and some of the recommended methods for
achieving success at the petition stage. Although this
information is in some sense peripheral to the material addressed
in the rest of the article, the general reader may find that it
provides useful context for the sections that follow.
44. Carter G. Phillips, Providing Strategies for Success: Petitioning the Supreme Court
for Certiorari, 46 For the Defense 22 (Apr. 2004) (noting that Phillips had by the spring of
2004 argued seventeen cases in which he was also responsible for the petitions).
45. See Cases Handled by Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw LLP during the 2005 US.
Supreme Court Term (July 13, 2006), http://www.appellate.net/about/sc2005cases.PDF
(accessed Oct. 17, 2007; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
46. See Supreme Court of the United States, Docket, http://www.supremecourtus.gov
/docket/docket.html (accessed September 13, 2007; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process). Searching "Carter G. Phillips" on this page yields a list of cases in
which Phillips appeared as counsel of record, including eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange
L.L.C., No. 05-130, in which certiorari was granted on November 28, 2005; Burlington N.
& Santa Fe Rwy. Co. v. White, No. 05-259, in which certiorari was granted on December 5,
2005; and Mohawk Ind., Inc. v. Williams, No. 05-465, in which certiorari was granted on
December 12, 2005. It also shows that Phillips was counsel of record in two additional
cases, Norfolk S. Rwy. Co. v. Sorrell, No. 05-746, and Environmental Defense v. Duke
Energy Corp., No. 05-848, in which certiorari was granted on the same day later in the
Term.
47. See e.g. Timothy S. Bishop, Jeffrey W. Sarles & Stephen J. Kane, Tips on
Petitioning for Certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, Circuit Rider 28, 28 (May 2007)
(noting that approximately four percent of petitions are granted). In accord with
convention, I use "paid cases" here to distinguish the cases to which this article refers from
the informapauperis cases filed at the Supreme Court by prisoners.
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A. Factors Leading to Review on the Merits
The four percent success rate for paid petitions in recent
Terms confirms the difficulty of persuading the Supreme Court
to hear a case on the merits. As the Court's own rules make
clear, review on certiorari "is not a matter of right, but of
judicial discretion., 48 In exercising this discretion, the Justices
and their clerks approach each petition with a "presumption
against a grant. 4 9 The petitioner must somehow overcome this
powerful bias by making a compelling-yet concise-argument
for certiorari. 50
Supreme Court Rule 10 lists the factors that the Justices
consider in deciding whether to grant a cert petition. They
include, among other things, conflicting opinions regarding an
important issue among the federal circuits, a circuit's significant
departure from the "accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings," a circuit's decision on an unsettled-yet
important-question of federal law, or a circuit's ruling that
conflicts with Supreme Court precedent.5'
According to a now-classic behind-the-scenes look at the
Supreme Court's screening process, a combination of these
factors must exist to make a case certworthy. 52 Among these
factors, a circuit conflict stands out as the most important. 53
48. Sup. Ct. R. 10 (available at http://uscode.house.gov). The rule also says, "A petition
for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons." Id.
49. H.W. Perry, Jr., Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme
Court 218 (Harv. U. Press 1991). In describing the presumption, one clerk remarked, "We
saw our role as clerks to find every reason possible to deny cert. petitions." Id. Another
added, "There is enormous pressure not to take a case... there is an institutionalized
inertia not to grant cert." Id.
50. One report estimates that the Justices spend five minutes or less on each petition for
certiorari. Stephen M. Shapiro, Certiorari Practice: The Supreme Court's Shrinking
Docket, http://www.appellate.net/articles/certpractice.asp (accessed Sept. 15, 2007; copy
on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
51. Sup. Ct. R. 10. The Rule also warns, "A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely
granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication
of a properly stated rule of law." Id.
52. Perry, supra n. 49, at 245.
53. See e.g. id. at 246. As research for his study into how the Court sets its agenda,
Perry interviewed several Justices and many of their former clerks. In discussing the
importance of circuit conflicts, one clerk told Perry that such "splits" were the "driving
force" behind the rare grant of review on certiorari. Id.
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Goldstein agrees, observing that "circuit conflicts so dominate
the cert docket that the [J]ustices appear to regard them as a
violation of a norm of federal law."5 As a result, most petitions
allege a conflict among the lower courts, particularly where the
split involves an outcome-determinative issue.55
After circuit conflicts, the second key factor bearing on
certworthiness is whether the petition presents an important
issue.56 In assessing an issue's importance, the Court considers
its breadth of effect as opposed to its depth.57 Specifically, an
issue affecting a great number of people is more important to the
Court than an issue likely to have a significant effect on only
one entity or individual.
58
A petition may demonstrate importance in a variety of
ways. For example, the petition might refer to a dissenting
opinion in the court of appeals or a judge's dissent from a denial
of rehearing en banc. 59 In addition, amicus briefs in support of a
petition for certiorari can prove invaluable. 60 Although difficult
to obtain, an amicus brief submitted by the Solicitor General on
behalf of the United States dramatically increases one's chances
of receiving plenary review.61 Should the federal government
refrain from filing on a petitioner's behalf, however, the next
best sources of amicus support include the states and certain
trade associations.
6 2
54. Goldstein, supra n. 6, at 68.
55. Phillips, supra n. 44, at 22-23. As one commentator writes, the experienced
Supreme Court practitioner will "[s]acrifice everything necessary to make the point [in the
petition] that [the] case is an ideal vehicle to resolve an indisputable circuit split." Tony
Mauro, Apprentice Appellants, XXVI Am. Law. 75 (June 2004).
56. Perry, supra n. 49, at 253.
57. Id. at 254.
58. Id.
59. Phillips, supra n. 44, at 23.
60. Id. Phillips points out that amicus briefs serve two purposes. First, they help a case
stand out visually by making the bundle of briefs delivered to each chambers for that case
appear more substantial than those petitions lacking amicus support. Second, from a
practical standpoint, an argument that a particular issue carries important implications for
the entire nation sounds more convincing in the presence of amicus briefs echoing that
sentiment. Id. at 24.
61. See id. at 23-24.
62. Id. at 24.
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In addition, and notwithstanding Rule 10's warning against
petitioning to correct erroneous factual findings or misapplied
law, 63 the Court's tendency to reverse cases on the merits
suggests that lower court error does improve a petition's
chances. Thus, an effective merits argument may spark the
Justices' interest. 65 As Phillips writes, "[I]t is worth a few pages
to make it clear that your client should win.'66
Despite the foregoing general guidance on certworthiness,
however, the process remains highly subjective and
unpredictable. 6 7 In fact, while a circuit conflict, important issue,
or erroneous lower court decision may make a case a stronger
candidate for review, any one of a list of factors can just as
easily lead to a denial of certiorari. For instance, some petitions
are deemed "clear denies," because the Court is simply not
interested in the issue presented. 68 Examples of traditional "clear
denies" include tax or patent cases.
69
63. See supra n. 51.
64. See Phillips, supra n. 44, at 26; Shapiro, supra n. 50.
65. See Shapiro, supra n. 50 (noting that Justice Brennan considered "apparent error" a
factor contributing to certworthiness).
66. Phillips, supra n. 44, at 26.
67. See William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: How It Was, How It Is 265
(William Morrow & Co. 1987) ("Whether or not to vote to grant certiorari strikes me as a
rather subjective decision, made up in part of intuition and in part of legal judgment."); see
also Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections on the Role of Appellate Courts: A View From the
Supreme Court, 8 J. App. Prac. & Process 91, 96 (2006) ("1 am uncertain precisely what
accounts for the reduced number of cases in recent years. When we go into Conference,
however, the Justices approach the petitions with an eye toward taking the cases, not with
an eye toward keeping the workload down."); Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard
Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court
Case Selection, 82 Wash. U. L.Q. 389, 452 (2004) (quoting Justice Jackson as saying that
in many instances, no one understands exactly why the Court denied certiorari).
68. Perry, supra n. 49, at 226-30.
69. Id. at 229-30. Note, however, that the Court may in coming years be more inclined
to grant review in patent cases. See e.g. Peter 0. Huang, eBay v. MercExchange as a Sign
of Things to Come: Is the Supreme Court Still Reluctant to Hear Patent Cases? 8 J. App.
Prac. & Process 373, 374 n. 5 (2006) (listing then-recent patent cases heard in the Supreme
Court). Indeed, the Court granted certiorari in a patent-royalty case as this article was
being prepared for publication. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elec., Inc., No. 06-937
(Sept. 26, 2007) (granting certiorari).
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Meanwhile, inadequate "percolation" among the lower
courts also spells doom for many petitions.7 ° Likewise, a
petition filed in a case with "bad facts"-those that might hinder
resolution of the question presented-or one filed in a case that
suffers from procedural defects will usually be denied,
particularly where other cases raising the same legal issue are
still being litigated in the lower courts.71 Finally.2 the Court
refuses many petitions that pose "intractable" issues for which
the Court cannot perceive adequate solutions.
73
B. Drafting an Effective Petition for Certiorari
The Court's rules mandate that petitions "be stated briefly
and in plain terms."74 Given that an overworked law clerk will
read the petition first, common sense dictates that the petition
should avoid rhetoric and must remain concise and readable.75
Although Court rules impose a thirty-page limit for petitions,
most successful submissions probably stay well below that
ceiling.76
Aside from these general suggestions, the leading Supreme
Court advocates offer the following specific tips for each of the
major sections in a petition for certiorari.
1. The Question Presented
Mayer Brown's Stephen Shapiro calls the first page of any
petition the "most important page in the entire document,"
70. Perry, supra n. 49, at 230-34. The Court would generally prefer to postpone
consideration of an issue until other judges and legal scholars have rendered their analysis.
Id. at 231.
71. Id. at 234-37. Where various lower court cases are addressing the same legal
question as that presented in a pending petition for certiorari, the issue is said to be "in the
pipeline." Id. at 236.
72. Id. at 239-44.
73. Id. at 240-41.
74. Sup. Ct. R. 14(3).
75. See Timothy S. Bishop & Jeffrey W. Sarles, Petitioning the United States Supreme
Court for Certiorari: A Primer, http://www.appellate.net/articles/petit799.asp (accessed
Sept. 15, 2007; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
76. See Phillips, supra n. 44, at 24.
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because it contains the question presented.77 He recommends
that the question presented "be the colorful fly that irresistibly
leads to a strike,",78 but Carter Phillips suggests using a "pithy
and largely neutral" tone.79 If necessary to convey the context
surrounding the question presented, a brief introductory
paragraph may be included. 80 Finally, if a conflict exists among
the lower courts, the question presented ought to acknowledge
it.
8 1
2. The Statement of the Case
After the question presented, a petition for certiorari must
contain a "concise statement of the case setting out the facts
material to consideration of the questions presented."82 This
portion of the petition should remain "simple and lean," because
any statement exceeding five or six pages conveys the
impression that the case is overly complex and "fact-bound.,
83
As in the question presented, any circuit conflict should be
mentioned here so as to "whet the reader's appetite. ' 84 In some
instances, it may make sense to begin the statement of the case
with a summary of the argument, rather than a mere restatement
of the facts.85 The statement usually ends with a description of
the holdings below. It is useful there to highlight any
provocative language from the lower court's opinion, including
whether the court recognized the existence of a circuit split or
felt constrained by ill-advised Supreme Court precedent. 86
3. The Argument
The statement leads to the petition's argument section,
77. Shapiro, supra n. 50.
78. Id.
79. Phillips, supra n. 44, at 25.
80. Shapiro, supra n. 50.
81. Phillips, supra n. 44, at 25.
82. Sup. Ct. R. 14(l)(g).
83. Shapiro, supra n. 50.
84. Id.
85. Phillips, supra n. 44, at 25.
86. See id. at 26.
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which sets forth the reasons for review.87 Typically, this section
includes a more formal summary at the outset before describing
any conflict among the lower courts.88 To facilitate the Justices'
understanding of the issues, a lower court conflict must be
adequately described; merely citing the cases and providing
parentheticals does not suffice.8 9 After presenting a lower court
conflict, the petition must convince the Justices of the issue's
importance. 9  Proving importance demands an imaginative
approach and may require reference to an issue's financial
consequences, the possibility of increased litigation, and the
practical difficulties presented when an area of the law is in
disarray.91 The argument section should also explain why the
decision below is wrong, combining in that explanation both
legal reasoning and an analysis of the relevant public policy.
92
Lastly, in the event that the respondent submits an opposition
brief, the petitioner should file a reply brief. This allows the
petitioner to respond to the opposition, get in a last word, and
bolster the arguments advanced in the petition.
93
IV. THREE ELITE ADVOCATES, THREE SUCCESSFUL PETITIONS
A. Introduction
The following analysis of three petitions filed during a
recent Term illustrates the role of an elite Supreme Court bar at
87. Sup. Ct. R. 14(l)(h).
88. Phillips, supra n. 44, at 26. Note that although Phillips advocates focusing the
argument on lower court conflicts, he maintains that an argument should not emphasize as
its leading point that the holding below conflicts with Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 23.
He bases this advice on the fact that "the Court ordinarily does not view its role as
involving mere error correction." Id.
89. Id.; see also Shapiro, supra n. 50 ("[l]t is not enough to allege the existence of a
conflict. The conflict must be proven. Describe the decisions asserted to be in 'conflict' in
sufficient detail, and with sufficient quotations, to make your conflict argument
unmistakable.").
90. Shapiro, supra n. 50.
91. See id.
92. Id.
93. Bishop & Sarles, supra n. 75.
THE SUPREME COURT BAR AND GRANTS OF CERTIORARI
the certiorari stage. Their authors are all prominent members of
that bar: As of this writing, Goldstein has argued seventeen
cases before the Court, 94 Pincus has argued sixteen, 95 and as
noted above, Phillips has argued more than fifty.96 Further, all
three advocates and their firms have enjoyed disproportionate
success in obtaining certiorari.97 And it appears that each was
hired, at least in part, for his expertise in drafting petitions for
certiorari, as none was counsel below in the cases analyzed
here. 9
8
Each of these petitions illustrates a different strategy for
proving certworthiness, highlighting the expertise and creativity
of elite Supreme Court advocates. In the first petition, Goldstein
demonstrates how to use a circuit conflict as the leading
argument for certiorari. Next, Pincus's petition boldly asks the
Court to revisit existing precedent. In the final petition, Phillips
extracts a certworthy issue from an otherwise fact-bound lower
court opinion. All three illustrate the lessons for certiorari
practice discussed above in Section III(B), and underscore the
important role that experienced counsel can play in setting the
Court's agenda.
99
94. See n. 11, supra.
95. See Andrew J. Pincus, http://www.mayerbrown.com/lawyers/profile.asp?hubbardid
-P139278592&lawyer-name=Pincus%2C+Andrew+J%2E (law-firm biography describing
Pincus's work in the Supreme Court).
96. Seen. 19, supra.
97. See text accompanying nn. 42-47, supra.
98. See In Re Rousey, 347 F.3d 689 (8th Cir. 2003) (indicating that counsel below did
not include Goldstein); Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (indicating that counsel below did not include Pincus); MercExchange,
L.L.C v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (indicating that counsel below did not
include Phillips).
99. In addition, comparing the Pincus petition with the opposition brief filed in the
same case further demonstrates that veteran Supreme Court advocates probably understand
the objectives at the certiorari stage better than do most other attorneys. See infra n. 152.
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B. The Goldstein Petition: Rousey v. Jacoway
1. The Issue as Stated
Working with the assistance of students in Stanford's
Supreme Court Clinic, Goldstein asks the Court in this petition
to settle a "three-way circuit conflict" regarding "whether and to
what extent Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) are exempt
from a bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. [§] 522(d)(10)(E)." 10
2. The Case Below
This issue arose because the trustee objected when the
Rouseys sought to exempt from their bankruptcy estate the
portion of their assets held in two IRAs containing funds rolled
over from a previous employer's pension plan. 10 1 Noting that it
was required by its own precedents to find for the trustee, the
Eighth Circuit held that the Rouseys' IRAs were not exempt.
10 2
Even so, the Eighth Circuit recognized that four other circuits
had held otherwise, and conceded that this alternate rule might
be "more consistent" with the purposes of the Bankruptcy
Code.'
0 3
3. Analysis of the Petition
The Eighth Circuit's acknowledgement of the obvious
circuit conflict makes the argument for review here much easier
than is typical. Indeed, that discord, so crucial to
certworthiness, 1°4 may explain the Rousey petition's brevity and
its lack of amicus support. 10 5 Nevertheless, the Rousey petition
illustrates the way in which a skilled Supreme Court practitioner
100. Pet. for Writ of Cert., Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320, 2004 WL 763798 (Apr. 6,
2004), at i.
101. In reRousey, 347 F.3d 689, 691 (8th Cir. 2003).
102. Id. at 693.
103. Id.
104. See supra nn. 53-55 and accompanying text.
105. The Rousey petition runs a mere eighteen pages, while the other two petitions
discussed here each span twenty-eight pages, and both enjoy considerable amicus support.
(The Rousey petition has none.)
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can make the most of a conflict.
From the outset of the petition, Goldstein establishes that
this case implicates a deep division among the circuits.'0 6 The
question presented asks whether the Court should resolve the
"three-way circuit conflict," and the statement of the case
mentions the "entrenched three-way split among the courts of
appeals,"' 7 using key cuotes from the Eighth Circuit's opinion
to reinforce that point. Thus, even before the reader reaches
the petition's argument section, the circuit split is apparent.
The argument maintains this focus. Not only does the first
heading label the courts of appeals "intractably divided," but the
argument's carefully chosen language also supports the
proposition that a conflict exists. 10 9 To foreclose any suggestion
that the issue has not undergone sufficient percolation in the
lower courts, the petition notes that the Eighth Circuit had
already denied rehearing on the ground that its long-established
precedent barred the grant of an exemption." 0 In addition, the
petition describes the Third Circuit's twenty-one-year-old rule
as "similarly entrenched.''' 1
One criticism that might be leveled against this petition is
that the cases from circuits that exempt IRAs are not given much
explanation beyond citation. 112 The straightforward nature of the
issue in this case makes such criticism unwarranted, however,
for a court either exempts IRAs or it does not. Furthermore,
106. As this petition makes clear, the lower courts fell into "three camps" regarding
whether to exempt IRAs from a bankruptcy estate. Rousey Petition, supra n. 100, at 5.
While the Eighth Circuit denied exempt status, the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits
permitted exemption. Id. at 6-8. The Third Circuit, meanwhile, refused to exempt future
IRA payments to debtors younger than the statutory threshold for withdrawal, but
exempted "present payments" to debtors who had reached that age. Id. at 9.
107. Id. at i, 2.
108. For example, the petition quotes the language in which the Eighth Circuit
recognized that several of its sister circuits disagreed with its holding. Id. at 5.
109. Id. at 6-10. Examples of this effective language include calling the Eighth Circuit's
position "unique," explaining the Third Circuit's stance as "yet another rule," and referring
to these circuits together as "outliers." Id.
110. Id. at 10. Given the denial of a rehearing, the petition argues, "This three-way
circuit split will not resolve itself without this Court's intervention." Id.
111. Id. One might contend that the age of the Third Circuit's rule renders any conflict
stale, but Goldstein uses the passage of time to his advantage, explaining that it
underscores the Third Circuit's recalcitrance.
112. See id. at 7.
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using only citations and parenthetical explanations for the other
circuits' decisions offers the added benefit of keeping the
petition short and readable.
The petition's streamlined discussion of the exempting
circuits also enables Goldstein to devote greater detail to the
Third Circuit's rule. For example, the question presented
challenges both the Eighth Circuit's decision in this case and the
Third Circuit's rule from prior cases.13 Later, the petition
spends two pages discussing Third Circuit case law. 114 Although
challenging both the Eighth and Third Circuits as "intractable
outliers" may appear overly ambitious, it permits Goldstein to
argue later that this case "provides an ideal vehicle to resolve the
three-way circuit split." " Because Goldstein attacks both
circuits, he also keeps the Court from passing over his petition in
favor of a later Third Circuit case.
Aside from its adept handling of the circuit split, the
petition also answers any concerns about the importance of the
question presented, which might initially seem mundane and
unworthy of the Court's review. Goldstein effectively illustrates
the importance of this issue by addressing both its breadth and
its depth. 116 To show the number of people affected by this
issue, the petition cites the staggering number of bankruptcies
filed each year, as well as the widespread use of IRAs.1 7 To
highlight the issue's depth, the petition explains the dire
financial consequences for individuals whose attempted
exemptions are denied."18 The use of these powerful statistics
transforms what might initially appear to be hyperbole 1 9 into a
113. See id. at i. By asking both "whether" and "to what extent" IRAs are protected, the
question presented seems to address both the Eighth Circuit's categorical denial and the
Third Circuit's practice of granting an exemption only to debtors of a certain age.
114. Id. at 9-10.
115. See id. at 11. The petition explains how, in light of the petitioners' ages when they
filed for bankruptcy and then filed their appeal, the Third Circuit's rule would dictate the
same result reached by the Eighth Circuit. Id.
116. See id. at 12-14; see also text accompanying nn. 56-58, supra.
117. Rousey Petition, supra n. 100, at 12.
118. Id. at 12-13 (discussing the significant amount of money saved in most IRAs, as
well as the fact that such accounts offer important retirement savings opportunities to self-
employed people and small-business employees).
119. Id. at 12 (stating baldly that "[tiens or even hundreds of thousands of people every
year are likely affected by the resolution of this issue").
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convincing argument for a uniform rule. It also demonstrates,
particularly in light of Goldstein's effective treatment of the
circuit conflict and his prudent decision to challenge the rules
applied in both the Eighth and Third Circuits, the advantage that
experienced Supreme Court advocates provide at the certiorari
stage.
C. The Pincus Petition: Illinois Tool Works Inc.
v. Independent Ink, Inc.
1. The Issue as Stated
Mayer Brown's Pincus asks in this petition whether, in a
lawsuit alleging unlawful tying under the Sherman Act, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant possessed actual market
power, or whether market power can be presumed from the
existence of the defendant's patent on the tying product.'
20
2. The Case Below
The underlying litigation began when Independent accused
Trident, an Illinois Tool subsidiary, of illegal tying by requiring
its patent licensees to use only unpatented Trident ink with the
patented 2rinthead technology that was the subject of the
licenses.
The district court rejected Independent's claim that this
arrangement violated the Sherman Act, holding that for patent
tying to be illegal, the plaintiff had to show that the defendant
possessed market power in the market for the tying product.
122
Because Independent failed to prove Trident's economic power
in the printhead market, the district court denied its claims.
The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that two Supreme
120. Pet. for Writ of Cert., Ill Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 2005 WL
779574 (Apr. 4, 2005), at i.
121. Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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Court cases "squarely establish that patent and copyright
tying... do not require an affirmative demonstration of market,24
power. Instead, the market power required to prove a
Sherman Act violation could be presumed from the existence of
the patent. 125 Although the Federal Circuit felt bound by this
precedent, it acknowledged that the market-power presumption
had faced considerable criticism from both members of the
Court and academic writers, and concluded that "[t]he time may
have come to abandon the [market-power presumption].
Nevertheless, the court said, "[I]t is up to the Congress or the
Supreme Court to make this judgment." 27
3. Analysis of the Petition
Armed with the strong language in the Federal Circuit's
decision, the petition for certiorari urges the Court to revisit its
patent-tying precedent. 128 Despite the Federal Circuit's open
invitation for the Justices to reconsider the market-power
presumption, however, Pincus faces a daunting challenge in
making the case for certiorari. 129 To persuade the Court to
accept the case, Pincus assembles a creative argument that is
noteworthy for both its length 30 and its lack of emphasis on
circuit conflict.' 3 1 Unlike Goldstein, who relies heavily on a
124. Id. at 1348 (citing U.S. v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962), and Intl. Salt Co. v.
U.S., 332 U.S. 392 (1947)).
125. Id. at 1348-49. But the court also held that this presumption was rebuttable. Id. at
1352.
126. Id. at 1351.
127. Id.
128. See Illinois Tool Petition, supra n. 120, at 7-9 (quoting Federal Circuit decision,
summarizing scholarly critique, and noting, among other things, that several members of
the Court had questioned the presumption's continuing vitality).
129. The petition acknowledges the gravity of its request by conceding that "[t]his Court
approaches reconsideration of its decisions 'with the utmost caution."' Id. at 8 (citing State
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)).
130. At twenty-eight pages, the petition easily exceeds Goldstein's eighteen-page
petition in Rousey, and of course it ignores the conventional wisdom that successful
petitions generally do not run beyond twenty pages. See supra text accompanying n. 76.
131. The petition eventually addresses the "disarray among the lower courts" over the
market-power presumption, but its discussion of the split appears relatively late in the
argument and accounts for just three pages of text. See Illinois Tool Petition, supra n. 120,
at 21-24. Given the importance the Court attaches to circuit conflicts, the decision to
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three-way circuit split,' 32 Pincus employs a handful of other
effective techniques, including a more frequent use of
exaggerated rhetoric, to demonstrate the certworthiness of his
case. And his skill in deploying them demonstrates that elite
representation makes a difference at the certiorari stage.
One way in which Pincus persuades the Court to reconsider
its precedents is by emphasizing the district court opinion. In
fact, the statement of the case devotes three full pages to the
proceedings in the district court.' 3 3 A critic might question this
use of resources, particularly given the general advice to keep
the statement of the case "simple and lean."'' 34 However, the
extended focus on the proceedings in the district court proves
effective, because it indicates that petitioners would prevail on
the merits absent the market-power presumption. 
35
The petition's other tactics further demonstrate the need for
the Court to reexamine the presumption. In one example, the
petition asserts that "on two separate occasions Justices have
questioned the International Salt-Loew's standard."'136 This
approach works particularly well, because it reminds the
Justices-the petition's ultimate audience-that two of them had
already urged reconsideration of the doctrine.' 37 If, as one
practitioner notes, a petition makes a convincing argument for
certiorari by citing a dissenting opinion from the panel below,
138
then referring to the Justices' own prior opinions seems likely to
be even more effective.
deemphasize this confusion among the lower courts is curious. It might, however, reflect
Pincus's judgment that persuading the Court to reconsider established precedent requires a
different approach.
132. See supra pp. 190-92.
133. Illinois Tool Petition, supra n. 120, at 4-6.
134. See supra text accompanying n. 83.
135. See Illinois Tool Petition, supra n. 120, at 5-6 (noting that the district court insisted
on "real proof' of Trident's market power, rather than simply presuming that such power
existed by virtue of the printhead patent, and that when Independent failed to "proffer any
evidence that [Trident possessed] market power," the district court granted summary
judgment).
136. See id. at 20-21.
137. The two were then-Chief Justice Rehnquist and then-Justice O'Connor, both of
whom were members of the Court in April 2005, when the Illinois Tool petitioners sought
review.
138. See Phillips, supra n. 44, at 23.
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The petition also argues that the policies of the federal
agencies charged with enforcing the Sherman Act-the
Department of Justice and the FTC-mandate a reconsideration
of the market-power presumption.' 39 To make this point, the
petition quotes both the agencies' antitrust guidelines 140 and
public speeches by leaders of the DOJ's Antitrust Division. 14 1 In
addition, after filing the petition, Pincus submitted a
supplemental brief highlighting a more recent speech by an
antitrust official calling for a grant of certiorari in the case and
reiterating the government's belief that intellectual property
rights do not necessarily confer market power.142 Thus, even
though the Solicitor General did not file an amicus brief at the
certiorari stage of this case, the petition and supplemental brief
effectively indicate the federal government's interest in the
litigation, and once again demonstrate the importance of
retaining experienced counsel who can show the Court that a
case is certworthy. 14
3
Whether describing the district court opinion, the Justices'
own criticisms, or the enforcement policies of the relevant
federal agencies, the petition leverages a broad range of
authoritative sources to make a convincing case for certiorari,
even citing to supportive scholarly authority. 144 It supplements
these third-party arguments, however, with its own bold attacks
on the market-power presumption. For instance, the petition
points out that the presumption "simply makes no sense in the
context of the Court's present-day tying jurisprudence" and
characterizes it as embodying "formalism over economic
139. Illinois Tool Petition, supra n. 120, at 17-19.
140. Id. at 17 (quoting the guidelines as providing that, "[t]he federal antitrust
enforcement agencies 'will not presume that a patent, copyright, or trade secret necessarily
confers market power upon its owner,' even in tying cases").
141. Id. at 18-19. As the petition states, one antitrust official said that "[b]ecause patents
do not necessarily confer market power, there is no presumption that tying arrangements
involving patented products necessarily are illegal." Id. at 18.
142. Supp. Br. of Petr., Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28,
2005 WL 1387955 (June 9, 2005), at I (citing speech by Assistant Attorney General R.
Hewitt Pate on June 3, 2005).
143. As expert Supreme Court advocates maintain, indicating that there is strong federal
government interest in the case usually increases the odds of obtaining review. See
discussion supra p. 184.
144. Illinois Tool Petition, supra n. 120, at 19-20.
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substance."'' 45 Perhaps Pincus turns to this sort of forceful
rhetoric, which is largely absent from Goldstein's Rousey
petition, because he fears that a more subtle tone might fail to
persuade the Court to revisit its precedent. In any event, this
strong language, which might seem out of place in another
petition, sounds credible here and proves highly effective when
read in conjunction with the similar statements made by the
district court, the Justices who raised the issue in other cases,
and the federal government.
The Illinois Tool petition must go to great lengths to
demonstrate the importance of the matter at issue because
persuading the Court to accept a patent case had been difficult in
what was then the recent past. 46 Faced with this challenge,
Pincus employs a handful of techniques to outline the issue's
significance. Like Goldstein in the Rousey petition, 147 he uses
key quotes from the appellate court's opinion to convince the
Court of the need to intervene. 148 Using a time-honored
technique, Pincus also explains how, with plaintiffs more likely
to withstand motions to dismiss and summary judgment, the
market-power presumption will engender an increase in
meritless lawsuits. 149 His reply brief further underscores the
importance of this issue by devoting its entire first paragraph to
a summary of the amicus briefs submitted in support of
certiorari. 15 Because amicus briefs can play such an important
role in demonstrating an issue's importance, Pincus wisely
ensures that they do not go unnoticed here.
145. Id at 10. The petition adds that in light of the Supreme Court's more recent tying
cases, it is "inconceivable" that the Court would adopt this market-power presumption
today. Id. at 14.
146. See Perry, supra n. 49, at 229-30. Although the Justices for years expressed little
interest in patent cases, that may be changing. See Huang, supra n. 69; see also Marcia
Coyle, Justices Ponder Printer Ink Case, 28 Natl. L.J. PI (Dec. 5, 2005) (reporting that the
then-current Term contained the Court's "heaviest patent docket in 40 years").
147. See supra n. 108 and accompanying text.
148. See Illinois Tool Petition, supra n. 120, at 7 (quoting the Federal Circuit as
recognizing the criticism leveled against the market-power presumption, but leaving it to
the Supreme Court to overrule its own precedent).
149. Id. at 26.
150. Reply Br. of Petr., Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28,
2005 WL 1182268 (May 17, 2005) at 1.
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With so much of the petition making a strong case for
certiorari, the phrasing of the question presented leaves the
reader disappointed. 15 1 Rather than conveying the urgent need
for Supreme Court review, the overly long and dry question
presented suggests the exact opposite: that this case presents a
dull and complicated patent issue. In fact, the question presented
is couched in terms so neutral that the respondent's brief leaves
it virtually unchanged. 1
52
The relative weakness of the question presented does not,
however, detract from what is otherwise a highly persuasive
petition. Through effective references to the district court
decision, the Justices' earlier opinions, and the federal
government's enforcement policies, the petition explains why
the Court must revisit its market-power presumption. In
addition, the petition's judicious use of forceful rhetoric and
policy arguments further solidifies the reader's impression that
the issue raised in it is of significant importance. The ability to
weave all of these techniques into a single petition confirms the
value added by expert Supreme Court advocates, and it helps to
explain their remarkable success in shaping the Court's agenda.
151. See Illinois Tool Petition, supra n. 120, at i.
152. See Respt. Br. in Opposition, Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547
U.S. 28, 2005 WL 1079177 (May 4, 2005), at i. Although he wisely leaves petitioners'
question presented intact, respondent's counsel fails to explain why the Court should not
accept the case. This appears to have been a mistake, for "[r]espondent's job is to show that
none of the traditional criteria for Supreme Court review have been satisfied .... The
opposition builds on and reinforces the general presumption of uncertworthiness that
characterizes the Supreme Court's entire screening process." Shapiro, supra n. 50. In this
case, respondent's counsel, rather than rebut petitioners' argument regarding the
importance of the issue or otherwise explain its uncertworthiness, relies almost entirely on
a merits argument in support of the market-power presumption. For instance, he writes,
"The presumption of market power in patents is not only solid law, it is solid economics,
and is a presumption which has conferred a substantial benefit on consumers throughout
the years." Br. in Opposition, supra this note, at 14. Later, respondent's counsel accuses
petitioners of engaging in an "illegal scheme" and asserts, "Most legitimate businesses do
not engage in patent tying." Id. at 23. These merits arguments illustrate a fundamental
misunderstanding of the objectives in certiorari practice and, when contrasted with
Pincus's effective petition, underscore the difference that skilled Supreme Court advocates
can make at the Court's agenda-setting stage.
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D. The Phillips Petition: eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.
1. The Issue as Stated
In this petition, Phillips seeks review of a Federal Circuit
decision mandating that in patent cases, absent exceptional
circumstances, a permanent injunction will issue upon a finding
of infringement. 153
2. The Case Below
The Federal Circuit articulated this general rule after
hearing an infringement appeal in which MercExchange alleged
that the fixed-price purchasing component of eBay's website
infringed its patents. 154  Although a jury found for
MercExchange, the district court had refused to enjoin eBay. 155
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the finding of
infringement but reversed the denial of a permanent
injunction. 15 In its lengthy opinion, the court focused largely on
the sufficiency of the evidence and other factual matters,
providing little analysis of whether a permanent injunction
should issue automatically upon a finding of infringement.
157
Yet in its brief discussion of injunctive relief, the Federal Circuit
relied on what it termed the "general rule that courts will issue
permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent
exceptional circumstances." 158  Concluding that no such
circumstances existed in this case, it reversed the district court's
denial of MercExchange's request for equitable relief.
159
153. Pet. for Writ of Cert., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., __ U.S. -, 126 S. Ct.
1837, 2005 WL 1801263 (July 25, 2005) at i.
154. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Readers
interested in additional analysis of this case, its procedural history, and its importance, can
refer to Huang, supra n. 69.
155. MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1326.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 1327-38.
158. Id. at 1339. The court repeatedly emphasized the fact that issuance of an injunction
should be the norm in these cases. For example, it characterized the denial of injunctive
relief as "rare" and an "unusual step." Id. at 1338-39 (citation omitted).
159. Id. at 1339.
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3. Analysis of the Petition
Unlike the appellate courts in Rousey160  and Illinois
Tool,161 the Federal Circuit in this case did not offer any
particularly provocative language suggesting the need for
Supreme Court review.' 62 Unable to exploit a lower court's
recognition of a circuit conflict or a suggestion that the Court's
precedent ought to be reexamined, Phillips turns to alternative
techniques to make the case for certiorari. For example,
although he generally advises against using as a lead argument
the fact that the lower court has deviated from Supreme Court
precedent, Phillips resorts to that strategy here.'163 In addition, he
relies heavily on the presence of amicus briefs-both in support
of certiorari and against it-to make the argument for Supreme
Court review. 
164
Although both the unorthodox lead argument and the
effective use of amicus briefs demonstrate the flexibility and
creativity that experienced Supreme Court counsel provide at the
certiorari stage, it is Phillips's distillation of the Federal
Circuit's fact-bound opinion to a single certworthy issue that
makes the eBay petition remarkable. As a veteran Supreme
Court advocate, Phillips knows not to contest the underlying
finding of patent infringement. 165 Instead, he challenges the
160. See supra text accompanying n. 108.
161. See supra text accompanying n. 148.
162. Indeed, the Federal Circuit expressed no reservations about its decision. It said,
"We therefore see no reason to depart from the general rule that courts will issue
permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances."
MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1339.
163. Compare Phillips, supra n. 44, at 23 (noting that to begin by arguing that the case
presents a conflict with a Supreme Court decision "will be read as a sign of weakness")
with eBay Petition, supra n. 153, at 13 (containing a first heading in the argument section
that characterizes the Federal Circuit's per se rule as "fundamentally inconsistent with...
this Court's rulings").
164. See Reply Br. of Petr., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,__ U.S. __, 126 S. Ct.
1837, 2005 WL 2600844 (Oct. 11, 2005) at 1-2. Here, Phillips highlights the presence of
numerous amici filing in support of eBay, asserting that "[t]hose submissions alone warrant
this Court's review of the important holding below in this case." Id. at 1. He also notes the
presence of respondent's amici, which provides further evidence of the issue's importance.
Id. at2.
165. A re-examination of that finding would involve the Court in a technical, fact-
intensive analysis, and would almost certainly lead to the denial of certiorari. See S. Ct. R.
10 ("A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of
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Federal Circuit's holding on the issue of whether a permanent
injunction must issue upon a finding of patent infringement.' 66
Phillips's decision to seek review of this single
straightforward issue must have pleased the weary clerks who
struggled through the Federal Circuit's cumbersome opinion
before reading the petition. The question presented here-more
so than the other two petitions analyzed in this article-
succinctly conveys the issue to be reviewed. 67 At the same time,
it foreshadows the petition's major themes by asking whether
the Federal Circuit "erred" in establishing its "general rule" that
a permanent injunction "must" issue. 68 Respondent's significant
revision in the opposition brief of Phillips's question presented
attests to the effectiveness of Phillips's work.'IW
. Another significant feature of Phillips's eBay petition is its
speculation that a circuit conflict would exist absent the Federal
Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals.17 0 Looking
to cases involving trademark and copyright law-and even
including in his analysis a few cases construing statutes much
farther removed from patent law-Phillips cites other lower
court decisions recognizing the importance of equitable
discretion in considering whether to issue permanent
injunctions.' 'v According to Phillips, these cases show that other
circuits would resist adopting the Federal Circuit's more rigid
doctrine in patent infringement cases. 172
The use of this analogy underscores the importance
experienced practitioners place on circuit conflicts when
petitioning for Supreme Court review. In this case, however,
erroneous factual findings.").
166. See eBay Petition, supra n. 153, at i.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See Respt. Brief in Opp., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., __ U.S. -, 126 S.
Ct. 1837, 2005 WL 2396812 (Sept. 26, 2005), at i (characterizing the issue as "[w]hether
the Federal Circuit correctly determined that the district court abused its discretion in
denying a permanent injunction under the case-specific facts presented here once
infringement was found").
170. See eBay Petition, supra n. 153, at 21 ("Although not directly in conflict because
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although the hypothetical circuit split is inventive, it is not
particularly compelling. Unlike the direct three-way circuit
conflict in Rousey, the dispute here is inherently speculative
given that only the Federal Circuit entertains patent 173
Furthermore, by citing only Second Circuit cases, Phillips
fails to explain how this issue could have undergone sufficient
''percolation" among the lower courts to merit Supreme Court
review. 1
75
At twenty-eight pages, the petition also seems long,
especially given Phillips's suggestion elsewhere that most
successful petitions do not approach the thirty-page limit. 176 In
particular, the twelve-page statement of the case ignores the
general principle that this segment of the petition ought to
remain "simple and lean" and consist of no more than five or six
pages.' 77 But rather than limit himself here to restating the facts,
Phillips uses the statement much as he uses the argument: to
make the case for certiorari. For example, the statement of the
case begins with a four-page summary of the argument, 78 which
provides context for the question presented 179 and illustrates the
issue's importance.' 80 Thus, although it lengthens the petition,
Phillips's decision to include an argument for certiorari at this
early stage of the petition is understandable, especially given the
absence of a genuine circuit conflict in this case and the Court's
traditional disdain for patent cases.
181
The statement of the case also makes good use of the
district court opinion.' 82 Phillips quotes from it extensively,
highlighting in particular the portion of the opinion in which the
173. See id.
174. See id at 22.
175. See supra n. 70 and accompanying text.
176. See supra n. 76 and accompanying text.
177. See supra n. 83 and accompanying text.
178. See eBay Petition, supra n. 153, at 1-4. Phillips has recommended this approach
elsewhere. See supra n. 85 and accompanying text.
179. See eBay Petition, supra n. 153, at 2 (explaining that the Federal Circuit's rule on
permanent injunctions disregards both a federal statutory scheme and Supreme Court
precedent).
180. See id. at 3-4 (arguing that the Federal Circuit's rule unduly burdens innovating
companies and will spawn massive amounts of litigation).
181. See supra n. 69 and accompanying text.
182. See eBay Petition, supra n. 153, at 8-10.
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court characterized the decision regarding injunctive relief as
"within [the] discretion of the trial judge." 183 Like the Illinois
Tool petition's reliance on the district court opinion in that case,
the eBay petition's focus on the trial court's judgment here
shows the reader that, absent the Federal Circuit's misguided
rule, the petitioners would win on the merits. Thus, by providing
a summary of the argument and a helpful recap of the district
court's opinion, this unusually long statement of the case
accomplishes its objective.
Phillips's petition in eBay once again illustrates the
importance of using veteran Supreme Court counsel at the
certiorari stage. His experience manifests itself in a number of
ways, including his choice to petition the Court solely on the
permanent injunction issue, as opposed to the fact-intensive
finding of patent infringement. His articulation of a hypothetical
circuit split, if not entirely convincing, nevertheless shows the
premium placed on creativity in Supreme Court advocacy.
Finally, the persuasive statement of the case reflects Phillips's
awareness that, with the odds of gaining review so small, every
page of a petition must advance the goal of persuading the
Justices to grant certiorari.
V. CONCLUSION
A growing number of attorneys have devoted their careers
to mastering Supreme Court advocacy. Although the demands of
this practice require a range of skills, perhaps the greatest
challenge arises at the certiorari stage, where the odds of
obtaining review are miniscule. Although the Court's certiorari
decisions remain highly subjective, certain experienced
practitioners enjoy disproportionate success in crossing the
Court's threshold. Whether making the most out of a circuit
court conflict, urging reconsideration of the Court's precedent,
or reducing a dense lower court opinion to one certworthy issue,
the three illustrative petitions discussed here reflect their
authors' understanding of the nuanced process by which the
Supreme Court sets its agenda. One can only conclude that
183. Id. at 8.
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hiring experienced Supreme Court counsel to petition the
Justices for review may improve one's chances considerably.
